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Information superiority can be obtained by enhancement of the command and 
control system. While weapon systems may have been developed to a point of decreasing 
returns regarding firepower, command and control ( )2C  systems can be developed 
further. The force that has superior C2 may win the fight in the future by information 
superiority. 
Currently, there is no appropriate methodology to assess the contribution from the 
C2 system to improved combat outcomes. This thesis develops a methodology to address 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) by modifying C2 theory developed by D.M. 
Schutzer. [Schutzer, 1982] I address the time line that Schutzer suggested as the key to 
addressing C2 improvements concretely and modify the MOE he designed. Based on this 
modified MOE, developed through simulation analysis of an air defense scenario, I 
quantify the improvement in command and control systems by the CEC system. 
This thesis introduces an anti-air defense scenario. There are two forces, a red 
force that attacks with anti-ship cruise missiles and blue force that defends with anti-air 
missiles. This scenario is modeled in a spreadsheet simulation, and explores modified C2 
theory with CEC system, based on Schutzer research and my enhancements. This 
simulation allows for a comparison of CEC versus Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and 
Platform Centric Warfare (PCW) at the same time. This analysis provides insights into 
any improvement and helps determine the effectiveness of CEC system. 
In estimating the C2 MOE mathematically, I define three parameters (decision 
time, information certainty, and human factor) and estimate their values and I calculate 
three factors (probability of survival, allocation ratio, and exchange rate). Information 
certainty and human factor are my contributions to C2 analysis. Information certainty of 
NCW and CEC is affected directly by the number of ships, but under PCW, information 
certainty stays constant. This implies the contribution of the network complexity to C2 
system. The human factor implies commander’s personal character. I assume that NCW 
is affected by both of these parameters, but that CEC is not affected by human factor.  
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I calculate the decision time for each C2 operating process and implement into 
MOE equation. The result shows that CEC can improve the friendly force chance for 
success relative to NCW and PCW. Superior information certainty greatly affects the 
MOE.  
I estimate the enhanced coefficient α  of the probability of survival based on a 
simulation model. I simulate an air defense scenario and use the input I derived 
explaining decision time, information certainty, and human factor as simulation 
parameters. In addition, I introduce missile inter arrival time into simulation. My 
simulation output indicates that PCW cannot be compared with NCW or CEC, in that 
PCW has no survivability within simulation environment. In order to estimate α and 
compare NCW and CEC, I develop a metamodel through polynomial regression based on 
simulation outputs. This metamodel show NCW and CEC are not affected by human 
factor but are affected by missile inter arrival time and information certainty. Both 
metamodels provide prediction capability by mapping a response surface.  
Based on the regression equations, I obtain 100 response surface points for each 
NCW and CEC, and calculate α with these data points. With a simple statistical 
calculation, I estimate mean value and variance ofα of CEC to NCW. The mean value is 
1.299 and variance is 0.00476, as the variance very small in relation to mean, I conclude 
with confidence that CEC can improve MOE by 1.299 relative to NCW.  
As a result, I find the NCW or CEC can improve capability of C2 system, with 
CEC providing the greatest improvement. Statistical analysis shows that NCW and CEC 
are not affected by human factor. Enhancement of C2 system results from the information 
certainty that is caused by network reinforcement. Finally, this research supports the CEC 
methodology and its contribution to engagement capability. 
 
xiv
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
Operations in the littoral theater have become the principal Navy scenario. In 
particular, the threat of enemy cruise or ballistic missile and supersonic aircraft emerged 
as the most critical and dangerous. Currently, the U.S. Navy is developing the 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) with Johns Hopkins Applied Physical 
Laboratory (APL). CEC allows for information superiority by enabling combat systems 
to share unfiltered sensor measurement data associated with tracks with rapid timing and 
precision to enable the disparate battle group units to operate as one. [Johns Hopkins, 
1995] 
Information superiority can be obtained by enhancement of the command and 
control system. While weapon systems may have been developed to a point of decreasing 
returns regarding firepower, command and control ( )2C  systems can be developed 
further. The force that has superior C2 may win the fight in the future by information 
superiority. 
Currently, there is no appropriate methodology to assess the contribution from the 
C2 system to improved combat outcomes. This thesis develops a methodology to address 
CEC by modifying C2 theory developed by D.M. Schutzer. [Schutzer, 1982] I address the 
time line that Schutzer suggested as the key to addressing C2 improvements concretely 
and modify the MOE he designed. Based on this modified MOE, developed through 
simulation analysis of an air defense scenario, I quantify the improvement in command 
and control systems by the CEC system. 
This thesis introduces an anti-air defense scenario. There are two forces, a red 
force that attacks with anti-ship cruise missiles and blue force that defends with anti-air 
missiles. This scenario is modeled in a spreadsheet simulation, and explores modified C2 
theory with CEC system, based on Schutzer research and my enhancements. This 
simulation allows for a comparison of CEC versus Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and 
Platform Centric Warfare (PCW) at the same time. This analysis provides insights into 
any improvement and helps determine the effectiveness of CEC system. 
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B. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
I introduce a new model by modification to existing C2 theory with addition of the 
CEC system. D. M. Schutzer’s C2 theory, though published over 20 years ago, reflects 
the effectiveness of advanced command and control system that approximates today’s 
interpretation of CEC. 
This research reviews Schutzer’s description and representation of three factors of 
his C2 MOE, which are the probability of survival, the allocation ratio, and the exchange 
rate. After an overview of the Navy’s proposed CEC system, I discuss how CEC is 
developed for air defense, to include CEC’s concept, special character, superiority and 
implication for C2 theory. The analysis focuses on the amount of decision time available 
for CEC system, and leads to conclusions regarding NCW and PCW, and their 
differences. 
Chapter III introduces the new analytical model with the concepts described in 
Chapter II. After describing MOE factors of C2 theory in detail, this study generates a 
modified new MOE model, modifies the probability of survival, allocation ratio, and 
exchange rate in C2 theory by considering the decision time changed by CEC, NCW and 
PCW operating systems. Finally, I will suggest a new model that can evaluate modern 
information warfare. 
In Chapter IV, the research focuses on a simulation model of anti missile defense 
during surface engagement between two forces. Red force attacks with anti-ship cruise 
missiles. My analysis measures the effectiveness of C2 system with modified MOE 
factors by CEC and NCW systems. I compare the results, noting how much the 
effectiveness of C2 system is increased after constructing CEC system and comparing to 
NCW system. Chapter V concludes this research with discussion of the implication of 
measuring effectiveness for developing a new information warfare system.   
C. SCHUTZER’S C2 THEORY 
D. M. Schutzer proposed an MOE for his model of naval engagement that 
represents a measure of the contribution of improved C2. This MOE compares the initial 
force size with the number of remaining forces after engagement in a certain time interval 
 and where each unit of force has its own special quantifiable values. [Schutzer, 1982] t
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Of great interest to this research is the MOE’s inclusion of the probability of 
survival, allocation ratio and exchange rate. An engagement between blue and red force 
causes damage by each opponent’s value with a specific ratio. Schutzer states that the 
number of remaining forces can be calculated as a function of the number of enemy force 
and the duration time of engagement. The MOE is calculated by comparing the ratio of 
initial value of force with remaining value of force after engagement. With this concept, 
Schutzer suggests that the MOE model measure the synergism of fighting power through 







MOE jjj  
Where,  = the value of blue remaining force after j>< 2jN th engagement 
      = the value of red remaining force after j>< 2jM th engagement  
>< 20N  = the value of initial total of blue and red forces in the specific jth 
engagement 













































Where, k = the number of unit in each type of blue force 
k’ = the number of unit in each type of red force 
Pkj = the probability of survival in jth engagement 
akj  = the allocation ratio of each types of blue force in jth engagement 
Xkk = the exchange rate of k unit blue force to k’ unit of red force which means the 
loss of blue force to the loss of red force during engagement 
qk’j = the probability of survival of red force 
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bkj = the allocation ratio of red force 
nkj = the number of unit blue force in jth engagement 
mk’j = the number of unit red force in jth engagement 
Based on this MOE, the effectiveness in C2 systems is influenced by these three 
elementary equations (1-2, 1-3, 1-4). In turns, equations 1-2 and 1-3 are influenced by 
three factors, the probability of survival, allocation ratio and exchange rate.  This relation 
is shown below. 
 
 





Probability of survival Exchange rate Allocation ratio 
Figure 1.   Hierarchy of MOE. 
 
Schutzer suggested MOE model and its ability to access as enhanced C2 system is 
very conceptual and abstract. He used time impact on three factors without detailed 
analysis. Each of these factors and their time impact are therefore examined in detail in 
Chapter III. I incorporate a more detailed description of the input factors that Schutzer 
includes in his equation for the probability of survival. I then use a simulation to examine 
the effects of varying these factors. The result is a model that can predict the impact of 
CEC (when compared to PCW and NCW) on an engagement. This result is, of course, 
very scenario dependent. 
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II.  OVERVIEW OF CEC 
A. CONCEPT OF CEC SYSTEM 
1. Introduction 
Operation in the littoral theater includes complexity never considered in the Cold 
War era. For theater air defense, the complexities include natural environment and its 
effects on sensor range and reduction in the time available for defense system to react. In 
addition, commercial, nonbelligerent aircraft and ships compound the already difficult 
problem of sorting friends, neutrals, and hostiles during major Allied operation involving 
many other ships and aircraft.  
To successfully perform its intended missions the Navy may need to defend itself 
and its assets ashore with combatants dispersed over thousand of square miles. Each 
combatant will possess one or several sensors totaling, perhaps, more than 50 among 
Allied threat forces, and each sensor will observe a somewhat different view of the 
situation because of its unique characteristic and vantage point. Amidst this disparity in 
knowledge among coordinating units are efforts to correlate target tracks and 
identification data via conventional command and control system and to coordinate 20 to 
30 missile launchers and a comparable number of interceptor aircraft. 
Coalescing this collection of equipment into a single war-fighting entity requires a 
system that will combine both new-generation and old air defense systems by sharing 
sensor, decision, and engagement data among combatant units, without compromising 
timeliness, volume, and accuracy of data. The system must create an identical picture at 
each unit of sufficient quality to be treated as local data for engagements, even though the 
data may have arrived from 30 to 40 miles away. If a common, detailed database is 
available to provide a shared air picture as well as the ability to engage targets that may 
not be seen locally, a new level of capability may be attained. [Johns Hopkins, 1995] 
This ability is precisely what the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) 
provides for a network of combatants. Recent tests demonstrated that from older, short-
range systems such as NATO Sea sparrow through the latest Aegis baseline, CEC can 
provide greater defense capabilities and even provide new types of capabilities to a battle 
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force. However, CEC does not obviate the need for advance in sensors, fire control, and 
interceptors. Rather, CEC allows the benefits of the newest system to be shared with 
older units and provides for greater total capability despite the decline in the number of 
U.S. and Allied forces. [Johns Hopkins, 1995] 
2. CEC Description           
CEC is based on the approach of taking full advantage of the diversity provided 
by each combatant at a different location with different sensor and weapons frequencies 
and features. This approach requires sharing measurements from every sensor (unfiltered 
range, bearing, elevation, and, if available, Doppler updates) among all units while 
retaining the critical data characteristics of accuracy and timeliness. For effective use, the 
data must be integrated into each unit’s combat system so that it can use the data as if it 
were generated onboard that unit. Thus, the battle force of units networked in this way 
can operate as a single, distributed, theater defensive system. A focus of the current study 
is comparing the important principle of operation to network centric warfare, which 
merely shares the operational picture and not target-quality tracking data. [Johns 
Hopkins, 1995] 
a. Composite Tracking  
CEC can share radar measurement data that are independently processed 
at each unit into composite tracks with input data appropriately weighted by the 
measurement accuracy of each sensor input. Thus, if any unit’s onboard radar fails to 
receive updates for a time, the track does not simply coast (risking loss or de-correlation 
from the tracks of other units reported over tactical command and control data links), but 
rather it continues because of data availability from other units. This function is 
performed for radar and identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system with IFF transponder 
responses as “measurement” inputs to the composite track in process. The composite 
track function is accompanied by automatic CEC track number commonality, even when 
tracking is being performed simultaneously at each unit. Also provided is the composite 
identification doctrine, as input from a console of a selected net control unit (NCU), for 




Figure 2.   Composite Tracking and Identification [From Johns Hopkins, 1995]. 
 
b. Precision Cueing 
To facilitate maximum sensor coverage on any track, a means of special 
acquisition cueing is available. If a CEC track is formed from remote data but a unit does 
not locally hold the with its radars, the combat system can automatically initiate action (a 
cue) to attempt the start of a local track if the track meets that unit’s threat criteria. A 
CEC cue allows one or several radar dwells (with number and pattern determined by 
accuracy of the sensor(s) holding the target). Given that at least one radar with fire 
control accuracy in the network contributes to the composite track of target, then cued 
acquisition by a phased array radar with only a single radar dwell at high power and 
maximum sensitivity is possible, even if substantial target maneuvering occurs during 
target acquisition. For rotating radar, the target may be acquired by a localized sensitivity 
increase in a single sweep rather than by requiring several radar rotations to transition to 
track. Studies and tests have showed that the local acquisition range can be greatly 
extended simply by not requiring the usual transition-to-track thresholds (for detection 
and false alarm probability control) to be required since the precise target location is 
known. Retention of radar accuracy within the CEC net is accomplished via a precision 
sensor-alignment “gridlock” process using the local and remote sensor measurement. 
[Johns Hopkins, 1995] 
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Figure 3.   Precision Cueing [From Johns Hopkins, 1995]. 
 
c.  Coordinated, Cooperative Engagement 
With the combination of precision gridlock, very low time delay, and very 
high update rate, a combatant may fire a missile and guide it to intercept a target, even a 
maneuvering one, using radar data from another CEC unit even if it never acquires the 
target with its own radars. This capability is known as engagement on remote data, and, 
with the Navy’s Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) series, allows midcourse guidance and 
pointing of the terminal homing illuminator using off board data. The remote engagement 
operation is essentially transparent to the combat system operators. Engagement can be 
coordinated, whether conventional or cooperative, via real-time knowledge of the 
detailed status of every missile engagement within the CEC network. Moreover, a 
coordination doctrine may be activated by the designated NCU for automated 
engagement recommendations at each unit based on force-level engagement calculation. 
[Johns Hopkins, 1995] 
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Figure 4.   Coordinated, Cooperative Engagement [From Johns Hopkins, 1995]. 
 
B. SUMMARY 
The CEC was developed in response to the need to maintain and extend Fleet air 
defense against advanced, next-generation threats as well as to complement advances in 
sensor and weapon systems. By networking at the measurement level, each unit can view 
the theater air situation through the collective sensors of the combatants, and units are no 
longer limited in knowledge of air targets and in missile intercept range by the 
performance limits of their own sensors. The result is a quantum improvement in which 
advance threats may be composite-tracked and engaged using remote data by networked 
units that would otherwise not have been able to track or engage them. In a 1994 U.S. 
News & World Report article, Rear Admiral Philip Coady, Jr., Director of Navy surface 
Warfare, observed about CEC that “the composite picture is more than the sum of the 
parts.” In providing the improvement in air defense performance, CEC has been 
recognized by Congress, DoD, and the Navy as dissipating the “fog of battle” by virtue of 
composite tracking and identification with high accuracy and fidelity resulting in an 
identical database at each networked unit. A new generation of precision coordination 
and tactics has thus been made possible, as recognized by the USS Eisenhower battle 
group command and staff. Further, substantial theater-wide air defense and coordination 
enhancements are possible in the joint arena by CEC integration into U.S. and Allied Air 
9
Force, Army, and Marine Corps sensors and air defense systems. This potential has led to 
congressional and DoD direction that the services explore joint CEC introduction. The 
CEC is the only system of its kind and is widely considered as the start of a new era in 
war fighting in which precise knowledge is available to theater forces, enabling highly 
cooperative operations against technologically advanced and diverse threats. [Johns 
Hopkins, 1995] 
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. SCHUTZER’S THREE FACTORS OF MOE IN C2 THEORY 
Schutzer describes three factors that impact the MOE in C2 theory. These factors 
are probability of survival, allocation ratio and exchange rate. I modify these equations 
later in this chapter, based on both a simple analytical model as well as simulation. 
An essential component of Schutzer’s theory is his detailed discussion of the steps 
in the search and engagement process and the times associated with these steps. In the 
figure below, it is clear that Schutzer focuses on 4 major processes (sense, process, 
compare, and decide). These four processes are divided further on right side (event 
occurs, event detected, etc). These right side events are defined in terms of time and are 
assigned the variable  with an appropriate subscript. The equations discussed throughout 
this chapter refer to the variables noted in the figure. Essentially, it was Schutzer’s 
primary conclusion that improved C
t
2 could reduce the time necessary to complete one or 
more of these events. 
 
    
To   EVENT OCCURS 
 
 




Tc   EVENT RECOGNIZED 
 
 































































Figure 5.   Time Impact Line [From Schutzer, 1982]. 
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1. The Probability of Survival 
The probability of survival is directly related to the probability of how fast and 
successfully a ship reacts to incoming enemy threat or attack in order to have sufficient 
time to defend themselves and other forces. In Schutzer’s C2 theory, the probability of 
survival is based on the ability to recognize and analyze enemy disposition. This means 
that the probability of survival increased by minimizing uncertainty about enemy 
disposition on the zone in battle where the commander is interested. The equation of 
probability of survival is as follows. 
Assume that the enemy units distribute randomly in the interested zone and 
density of enemy distribution is
N
A=ρ , where, N is the number of force, and A is area of 
interested zone. If the uncertainty in this zone is A∆ , the area of a sensor’s coverage, 
AN ∆= ρ (which refers to blue force), the equation about accuracy of information is  
(Probability of correct information) )13(
1
1 −∆+= AP ρ  
The probability of accuracy about enemy force decreases as uncertainty A∆  
increases.  is composed of four combat elements. These are V (enemy movement 




ρ (density of enemy unit that can be threat to friend force’s survival) and these 
can influence the accuracy of information. That is . Apply this equation 







−+= σρ cspc tVC
P  
Schutzer postulated that this probability of correct information is directly linked 







P σα  
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Where,   =  Arbitrary constant 1C
α     =  Coefficient of the probability of survival  
pV    =  Speed of platform 
2σ   =  Initial information accuracy 
He also stated that the more the C2 system is reinforced, the more the 
effectiveness of combat element increases. Then as the probability of gaining information 
about the enemy increases, the probability of survival also increases. Thus, the 
probability of survival after reinforcement in command and control system is improved 
by a factor designed as α , such that probability of survival is now kjPα . [Paek, 2002] 
P (probability of survival before reinforcement in system) < 2C Pα (probability of 
survival after reinforcement in C  system), here 2 1>α  
 
2. The Allocation Ratio 
The allocation ratio is that ratio of assets put into specific engagement. It is 
represented by the ratio of friendly assets relative to the area of battlefield that the 
commander can control. The maximum input ratio is 1 before reinforcement. The C  
system is reinforced in the battlefield zone where command and control may be 
expanded. The results are that the force could be able to achieve superiority in searching, 
detection, and decision-making. It equates to increase effectiveness of assets. The force 
can obtain the same result with smaller units after reinforcement in the system. 
2
2C
The allocation ratio of force unit is a function of controllable range . The 
controllable range is a function of maximum weapon firing range, speed of platform, and 
the difference between available time and maximum weapon flight time. The equation is 
as below, 
( )cr
)43()( −−+= wapwc ttVrr  
Where, = Controllable range cr
wr = Maximum weapon firing range 
pV = Speed of platform 
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at = Available time of unit force 
wt = Maximum weapon flight time  
In equation 3-4, the maximum weapon firing range and maximum weapon flight 
time are constant, so available time of unit force ( )at  is the main factor in deciding 
controllable range. The more time a force unit has, the larger its controllable range. 
Schutzer revised the above equation to reflect the ratio of previous controllable 













This revised allocation ratio is based on the point of a controllable zone rather 
than controllable range because the commander is more interested in an area of control, 
rather than merely a controllable range. As controllable range is increased, controllable 











Where,  = arbitrary constant and 0C










In equation 3-7, the allocation ratio is a function of available time because all 
terms are constant except available time. Therefore, the greater the available time is, the 
more the controllable zone. 
If the command and control system is reinforced, available time is increased and 
the controllable zone is also expanded. The equation of the allocation ratio after 











Where,  = Increased available time after reinforcement  aat
14
δ = Factor of dense force or incremental attrition of allocation ratio and this equation 
satisfies next condition, 
 
a  (the allocation ratio before reinforcement) < aδ (the allocation ratio after 
reinforcement) (where, 1>δ ) 
 
3. The Exchange Rate 
The third MOE factor in C2 theory is the exchange rate. The enhanced C2 system 
can improve a platform’s individual effectiveness. The exchange rate is directly related to 
the probability of survival. The probability of survival may increase by decreasing 
command and control time, which can enable quicker reaction and reduce damage from 
enemy attack before the enemy is prepared damage to the other force. As a result, 
exchange rate can also increase by coefficientγ . Therefore the exchange rate is as below. 
[Paek, 2002] 
( )93]}[1{ 22130 −+= csptVCCX ρσγ  
Where, ,  = Arbitrary constant 1C 3C
0X  = Exchange rate 
ρ  = density of enemy 
2σ  = initial accuracy of information  
pV  = Speed of platform 
γ  = Coefficient of exchange rate that represents the improvement of enhanced C2 
system 
0X  (the exchange rate before reinforcement) < 0Xγ (the exchange rate after 
reinforcement) (where, 1>γ ) 
 
B. MODEL ENHANCEMENT 
1. Abstract of Three Kinds of C2 Process 
The difference among Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), Network 
Centric Warfare (NCW) and Platform Centric Warfare (PCW) is the informational link 
between platforms. PCW links each other through only CIC (Combat Information 
Center). NCW links radar and CIC within all platforms, so that each platform can share 
information in real time. That is, PCW cannot share information, but NCW can share 
Common Operation Picture (COP). CEC is distinguished by Central Control (CC). CC of 
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CEC system can decide and assign air defense mission to individual platform 
automatically. The graphical representation of each C2 process is in Figure 6, with spy-





Platform-Centric : divided duties 
     





Common operating picture  
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Figure 6.   Three Operation Processes [From RAND, 2002] 
 
2. Concept of New MOE Model        
Schutzer anticipated the enhancement of C2 systems 21 years ago. He estimated 
that enhanced C2 systems could reduce the time that the commander spent deciding 
during engagement. He suggested an MOE impacted by enhanced C2 systems, but he did 
not define time impact and information in detail. I analyze and define this time impact 
information with CEC and NCW C2 processes because both of these two processes are 
enhanced C2 systems. In other words, these can shorten the commander’s decision time 
and improve information superiority. As mentioned above, I will develop possible factors 
that impact decision time, and apply them to CEC, NCW and PCW. In addition to the 
time factor, information and controllable range are important but abstract factors in 
Schutzer’s theory. Therefore, I will analyze these factors in detail.  
3. Analysis of Three Parameters 
As mentioned above, the MOE of C2 system is affected by the type of the 
operating process. I modify three factors that are contained in the MOE (probability of 
survival, allocation ratio, and exchange rate) using three significant parameters. One of 
these parameters is decision time. I introduce two new parameters to modify decision  
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time. These are information certainty and human factor. The figure below is a 
representation of these factors, parameters and their relationships. Available time is 
discussed later in the chapter. 
 
 
Probability of survival Allocation ratio Exchange rate 
Information certainty 
Decision time Available time 
Human factor 





Figure 7.   Three Factors and Three Parameters. 
 
a. Assumptions 
I proceeded with three basic assumptions. First, the scenario in this study 
is restricted to air defense. I make this assumption because CEC is developed for the 
purpose of air defense. While NCW and CEC C2 processes should be beneficial to both 
defense and attack, the commander in the attack has more decision time than defense, as 
he be able to choose attack time and place, and therefore is less reliant on extending 
decision time. 
The second assumption stems from the fact that air defense decision is 
made by the task force commander. When missiles are coming directly at a friendly ship, 
the individual ship defends itself without reporting to task force commander. But the goal 
of developing command and control systems is to foresee and preempt an attack. NCW 
and CEC are expected to provide the capability to detect the enemy from long distance 
and respond before a threat comes closer. Therefore, I assume that individual ships must  
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report to the task force commander if any ship detects incoming missile. Then, the 
commander decides and assigns the air defense mission and the assigned ship 
counterattacks against incoming missile. 
Third, I assume every ship in task force can cover other ships, and task 
force commander assigns one incoming missile to each ship. This requires ships to be 
located closely together, but enable the task force commander to avoid assigning more 
than two rounds of incoming missile to individual ship.  
This study does not assert that more dense ship stationing, which supports 
mutual defense, is superior to more dispersed force formation. It simply focuses on the 
mutual defense scenario for analysis. 
b. Analysis of Decision Time 
Decision time (  is the time available for the task force commander from 
sensing to deciding. It is the same time duration from T
)cst
o until Tc in Figure 7, as defined 
by Schutzer. I redefine this time duration into three terms, which are Report time ( )`rtt , 
Tactical decision time  and Order time( tdtt ) ( )ott . Thus, the decision time  is  ( cst )
)
)103( −++= ottdtrtcs tttt  
Report time  is the communication time to report incoming missile 
information from the individual ship that detects missiles to task force commander. I 
model  for each version of C
( rtt
rtt
2 as seen below.                                                         
• PCW: The time to report changes with individual speech speed, 
communication stability, and so forth. However, the difference between 
individual is expected to be very small. Therefore, I set it as a constant 
( ).    2C
• NCW and CEC: I set t  in NCW and CEC as ‘zero’. CEC and NCW 
share COP in real time, so task force commander can notice air threat 
without reports from individual ships. Therefore, individual ships need not 
report to task commander. Therefore, report time
rt
( )rtt  is 
PCW: C  2
NCW and CEC:  ‘0’ 
19
Tactical decision time ( )tdtt  is the time from report to the decision by the 
commander. This tactical decision time is related to maximum reaction time ( )rt . 
Maximum reaction time is the maximum available time to decide from detection air 
threats until firing anti air missile. Commander has to make a defensive decision within 
maximum reaction time.  I assume that the commander makes tactical decisions with two 
important resources, which are accurate information certainty ( )I  and human factor ( )h . 
The task force commander needs information to make the best tactical decision. Given 
accurate information, the commander decides easily and quickly. Decision time also 
changes with human factor. Human factor is difficult to quantify. It relates to the level of 
training, strategic knowledge, tactical experience, personal character, and so forth. All 
these factors converge into what I call human factor. For instance, a task force 
commander who is well trained and has a wealth of strategic knowledge and experience 
can be expected to make a decision easily and quickly. I regard this as optimistic 
scenario. Therefore, decision time will be decreased as information certainty increases 
and human factor rating improves. Since, CEC can decide and distribute air defense 
mission assignment order automatically, it has no human dimension. Therefore, decision 
time is 








Where, I  :  Information certainty ( )1≥I  
h  :  Human factor (Optimistic 0 1<< h  Pessimistic) 
rt  : Maximum reaction time                                                          
Order time  is communication time from task force commander to 
individual ship, which is essentially report time
( ott )
( )rtt , but the communication time is in the 
opposite direction. It is the time to deliver task force commander’s decision. But it differs 
among the three C2 processes:       
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• NCW and PCW: I assume that t  is small, but consistent, so it is treated 
as constant (C ).    
ot
3
• CEC : I set t  at zero, because CEC can distribute decision automatically. ot
Therefore, order time ( )ott  is 
NCW and PCW : C  2
CEC : 0 
After analyzing the task force commander’s decision time from the point 
of view of these three main factors, I found that commander’s decision time (  is the 
most significant. Essentially, the other two factors
)tdtt
( )otrt tt ,  can be treated as constant or 
‘0’. Therefore, decision time  for each C( cst ) 2 mode is defined as:  
PCW: ( )133432 −+×=+×+= CI
htC
I
htCt rrcs  
NCW: ( )1433 −+×= CI
htr
cst  
CEC: ( )153 −=
I
tt rcs  
 
c. Analysis of Information Certainty and Human Factor 
Information certainty ( )I  implies potential value of network. If a network 
has an increased number of sources and nodes, information certainty is assumed to be 
improved. Another assumption is that entire network is connected each other firmly, and 
I assume that network has no loss of potential value. This is especially true for CEC due 
to its superior grid lock and correlation algorithms, as discussed in Chapter II. In order to 
estimate potential value of network, I use the ‘Metcalfe’s law’. Metcalfe’s law states that 
“The source of potential value is a function of the interactions between the nodes. For 
every ‘n’ node in a network, there are ‘n-1’ potential interactions between the nodes. 
Therefore, the total number of value creating interaction is . For large n, the 





The number of nodes in task forces differs according to C2 operating 
process. PCW has no interaction among ships in task force, and has only 1 node. The 
number of nodes in NCW is the same as the number of ships in a task force because all 
ships interact. Finally, the number of nodes in CEC is always greater than the number of 
ship by 1, because CEC has the ‘central control’ in a task force. This relationship is seen 
in Figure 6. 
 
Number of node Number of ship PCW NCW CEC 
N 1 N N+1 
 
Table 1. Number of Node in Operation Process. 
 
The potential value of each C2 operating process is summarized in Table 
1, based on Metcalfe’s law. Information certainty means the potential value of Metcalfe’s 
law. In other words, the more interaction in an operating process, the more information it 
has. Increased information certainty should improve the value of MOE. As shown in the 
figure below, information certainty remains similar between NCW and CEC, but PCW 





















Figure 8.   Information Certainty with Applying Metcalfe’s Law. 
 
In order to compare the human factor component of decision time, it is 
important to consider the air defense operation procedures for each C2 methodology. I 
assume that a task force commander with NCW or CEC system detects an air threat using 
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the common operating picture (COP). An individual ship with PCW has to report to 
commander. A commander with PCW or NCW makes the overall tactical decision and 
assigns defense mission to one of its ships in task force. The ship assigned fires an anti air 
missile. This implies that there is a human factor. I demonstrate the effect of information 
certainty and human factor on decision time in the figure below. 
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Figure 9.   Decision Time with Human Factor. 
 















Figure 10.   Decision Time with Information Certainty. 
 
Specifically, from equations 3-13, 3-14, and 3-15, I calculate t for each 
C
cs
2 system, while varying the value of human factor or uncertainty. As seen in Figure 10, 
the decision time of PCW increases as human factor of commander becomes pessimistic, 
with constant 3 ships. For example, commander who is absolutely pessimistic (1) uses the  
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maximum decision time that he can spend. He has little confidence in his decision. This 
delay of decision time should result in the reduction of the probability of survival. It is 
also related to available time.  
On the other hand, the absolutely optimistic commander shows similar 
results in NCW and CEC. Figure 10 shows the effect of varying the number of ships 
when human factor is constant. PCW has the same decision time because it has just 1 
node regardless of the number of ships. In other words, information certainty for PCW is 
not affected by number of ships. Decision time of NCW and CEC is decreased by 
increment of the number of ship.  
d. Analysis of Available Time 
The available time ( )att  as described by Schutzer, means how much time 
the task force has available from deciding response until execution of response. It is the 
surplus time from threat detection to react time. It contributes by addressing the 
controllable range  of task force or individual ship. It can be represented as shown 
below. 
( )cr
( )163 −−= csrat ttt  
Where, t  : Maximum reaction time r
cst  : Decision time 
By applying equations 3-13/14/15 into 3-16, the equation of available time 
becomes:  
PCW: ( )1734 −−×−= CI
httt rrat   
NCW: ( )1833 −−×−= CI
httt rrat   
CEC: ( )193 −−=
I
tt rratt   
Where, ∀  0≥att
Therefore, shorter decision time needed by the task commander to make a 
decision increases the available time to act. The available time is directly inverse of 
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decision time. The interesting fact is that commander can spend this available time 
usefully. This variance in available time may greatly influence the engagement result. It 
also affects controllable range and it affects allocation ratio.   
4. Implementation of Three Factors to the Elementary Equation of 
MOE in C2 Theory 
Based on the equations developed above, I implement three factors (decision 
time, information certainty and available time) into three elementary equations 
(probability of survival, allocation ratio and exchange rate) of MOE in C  theory.  2
a. Implementation to the Probability of Survival 







P σα  
Where,   = Arbitrary constant 1C
 α  = Coefficient of the probability of survival 
  = Speed of enemy platform pV
  = Initial information accuracy 2σ




( )pV  toward the friendly force may change little; initial information 
accuracy ( )2σ  includes enemy distribution, probability of detection, sensor accuracy 
(capability), methodologies to detect (ship mounted radar, air craft, UAV) and so forth. 
These two parameters are important but are assumed to have little relation with time 
impact. I substitute decision time ( )cst  into the equations of 3-13/14/15. The modified 























































α )                          
Based on the equations above, I compare the probability of survival 
among the three C2 processes. Figure 11 shows the effect of human factor with constant 
number of 3 ships. The probability of survival of CEC remains constant, because CEC 
has no human factor. The difference between CEC and NCW and between CEC and 
PCW is large because the value of decision time ( )cst  is square in the denominator. 
Therefore, CEC has definite potential of enhancing C2 systems.  
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Figure 11.   Probability of Survival with Human Factor. 
 

















Figure 12.   Probability of Survival with Information Certainty. 
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 Figure 12 shows the change in probability of survival as information 
certainty varies. The probability of survival of CEC increases rapidly with increased in 
information certainty but PCW and NCW maintain similar low probability. This implies 
that CEC is most effective with a large task force.       
b. Implementation to the Allocation Ratio  











In this equation, Schutzer did not define V (platform velocity), 
(weapon flight velocity) and t  (maximum weapon flight time) in detail. I regard 
these (V , V , and t ) as arbitrarily constant because these values are assumed to vary 
only slightly among threats. I substitute t (increased available time) with , as 
available time. After applying equation 3-17/18/19 with simple algebra, the modified 
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Figure 13.   Allocation Ratio with Human Factor. 
 
The allocation ratio based on the three C2 processes shows that PCW 
(Figure 13) varies more with human factor relative to NCW and CEC. However, human 
factor has little effect regarding the allocation ratio of NCW and CEC.  
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Figure 14.   Allocation Ratio with Information Certainty. 
 
Figure 14 shows the relationship between allocation ratio and information 
certainty (number of ship). It is clear that information certainty has a little effect on 
allocation ratio, meaning that information certainty will be unlikely to improve the ability 
of a task force commander to concentrate his forces.  
c. Implementation to the Exchange Rate 
Schutzer’s equation of the exchange rate is 
( )93]}[1{ 22130 −+= csptVCCX ρσγ  
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In this equation, ρ (enemy distribution), (initial information accuracy) 
and V (platform velocity) are set as arbitrarily constant. I substitute arbitrary constant C  
with C  to avoid confusion because I used C  in the equation of decision time. After 



















htVCCX rpρσ  













htVCCX rpρσγ  













tVCCX rpρσγ  
I compare the exchange rate among three operation processes graphically 
below. Figure 15 shows that when only considering human factor, the exchange rate of 
NCW and CEC has little difference, but the exchange rate of PCW increases sharply with 
higher value for human factor. Human factor can greatly influence exchange rate of PCW 
but influence little on NCW and CEC. Figure 16 shows that after adding the number of 
ships, exchange rate of NCW and CEC change slightly but PCW is not changed. As a 
result, PCW is affected by only human factor, but NCW and CEC are little affected by 
the information certainty and human factor at the same time. 
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Figure 15.   Exchange Rate with Human Factor. 
 




















Figure 16.   Exchange Rate with Information Certainty. 
 
5. Implementation to MOE in C2 Theory 
I analyzed three factors, parameters and three elementary equations which are 
used to modify MOE in C  theory. Each equation shows the effect of decision time as it 
depends on information certainty and human factor. However, it is difficult to understand 
the overall improvement caused by enhanced C
2
2 system with each individual equation. 
Therefore, I estimate the improved MOE by modifying the original MOE equation in 








MOE jjj  
Where, <  =  The value of blue remaining force after j>2jN th engagement 
   <  = The value of red remaining force after j>2jM th engagement  
   <  = The value of total initial of blue and red forces in the specific j>20N th  
engagement.  















































Where,   k = the number of unit in each types of blue force 
 k’ = the number of unit in each types of red force 
 Pkj = the probability of survival in jth engagement 
 akj = the allocation ratio of each types of blue force in jth engagement 
 Xkk’ = the exchange ratio of k unit blue force to k’ unit of red force which 
means the loss of blue force to the loss of red force during engagement 
 qk’j = the probability of survival of red force 
 bkj = the allocation ratio of red force 
 nkj = the number of unit blue force in jth engagement 
 mk’j = the number of unit red force in jth  engagement 
Schutzer suggested the MOE model is improved by enhanced C2 system 













Assuming the probability of survival, allocation ratio and exchange rate 
are independent of type of ship k and engagement j, Schutzer generalized the variables 
and remove subscripts. Therefore, substituting the variables for N and M from equations 
3-31 and 3-32 into equation 3-33, following some algebra, the result is: 










Using equation 3-34, I find out how much the MOE increases with 
enhanced C2 system. I assume three simple engagement situations, where two naval task 
forces engage, with N representing blue force and M representing red force. Both forces 
have same number and class. The only difference is the C2 system. Three situations are: 
Situation 1: Blue force with NCW against Red force with PCW 
Situation 2: Blue force with CEC against Red force with PCW 
Situation 3: Blue force with PCW against Red force with PCW 
I consider the effect of information certainty and human factor at the same 
time. The information certainty of task force increases, while the human factor becomes 















MOE of blue force
CEC 
Figure 17.   MOE of Blue Force with the Information Certainty (Number of Ship). 
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 Figure 17 show that CEC increases significantly as the number of ships 
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IV. SIMULATION AND OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
A. PURPOSE OF SIMULATION 
In Chapter III, I discussed an improved MOE and studied its appropriateness with 
an analytical model. The results show that CEC is the most effective C2 system, NCW is 
next best and PCW is the least effective operating process. The probability of survival, 
allocation ratio and exchange rate make up this MOE. The prominent factors of these 
equations are decision time, information certainty and human factor. In my streamlined 
model, the difference among C2 operating processes is a result of these three parameters. 
Decision time and information certainty were shown to affect MOE significantly, but 
human factor appeared to have little effect on CEC and NCW. A weakness of this 
analytical model is that it is limited by its static and deterministic inputs. I therefore build 
a spreadsheet simulation that can include randomness in battle outcomes, as well as 
allowing for an experimental design that can examine the range of input parameters, the 
magnitude of factor, main effects and possible interactions.  
B. SCENARIO 
The scenario concerns group air defense performed under the task force 
commander. Red force maneuvers to invade blue force without proclamation of war. Blue 
force conducts reconnaissance and observes red force intention and movement. I have 
several assumptions to transfer scenario into simulation model.  
Red force eventually (see Figure 19) attacks with its missiles and blue force 
defends against incoming missiles to survive. Air defense operation is performed by task 
component commander. Each ship has the responsibility to detect and report incoming 
missile. The task force commander integrates target information, analyzes the air threat, 
decides upon an appropriate action, and allocates defense mission. The ship assigned to 
the mission fires anti air missile without delay. However, there is one exceptional case. If 
the enemy missile comes directly at a ship, and the individual ship detects a short 
distance from its position, the individual ship commander defends itself. 
Red force capability is represented by inter arrival time of incoming missile. If the 
red force has strong combat strength, the inter arrival time is short. On the other hand, if 
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red force is killed by blue force counter attack, inter arrival time becomes larger. The 
other two variables in the simulation are I , information certainty, and h , the human 







 Air defense situation 
Figure 19.   Air Defense Situation. 
 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
(1) I do not explicitly model Red force ships in the enemy task force, but rather 
the amount of missiles they have and their frequency of firing. The interarrival time 
between incoming missile and quantity represents Red force size and capabilities.  
(2) Blue force is consisted of same type of AEGIS platform. Each ship has same 
detection probability of detecting missile and same probability of kill of anti air missile. 
(3) Task force commander allocates defense mission as one ship to one missile to 
maintain defense capability equally in task force. AEGIS platforms can counterattack 
against several incoming missile at one time. Task force commander wants to detect at a 
long distance, to reduce individual platform responsibility for defense and control entire 
task force missile inventory to expand chance to engage, by distributing the mission 
across the force. 
(4) Each ship will be sunk or neutralized after two hits by a missile which occurs 
when a missile arrives at a ship before it finishes its defense mission.  
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D. SIMULATION DESCRIPTION 
I examined the probability of survival with simulation to estimate the effect of the 
three different C2 systems on the enhancement coefficientα . I also address the updated 
MOE as described at the end of Chapter III, and the relation among three factors 
(decision time, information ratio and human factor) and the probability of survival.  
The probability of survival equation contains three parameters, as discussed 
earlier. These are platform velocity ( )pV , initial information accuracy ( )2σ  and decision 







P σα  
As with my analytical model, I focused on decision time for simulation because of 
the importance of time in the commander’s decision, and because the other two variables 
can be held constant for a specific scenario. Decision time, as discussed in Chapter III, 
depends on information certainty and human factor. Decision time is as shown below.  
PCW: ( )133432 −+×=+×+= CI
htC
I
htCt rrcs  
NCW: ( )1433 −+×= CI
htr
cst  
CEC: ( )153 −=
I
tt rcs  
In order to simulate, I apply concept of queuing model. A typical queuing model 
consists of customer and their arrival times, servers and their service time, a 
representation of server “interaction” (parallel or series) and a method of handling 
anticipated queues. These representations are summarized below. 
Queuing model Component Scenario 
Customer Incoming missile 
Inter arrival time Uniform arrival time 
Server Friendly ship 
Server allocation Parallel 
Service time Decision time 
Queue No queue 
 
Table 2. Simulation Model Description. 
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An important concept from this table is that this simulation model does not allow 
a queue. A missile that is not serviced hits the blue ship, representing the enemy’s 
success. Another important concept is the assumptions of inter arrival time of incoming 
missile. I used a uniform distribution for inter arrival times. I use decision time as service 
time. Defense time against incoming missile mainly depends on decision time; anti air 
missile flight time does not affect defense time.   
Two of the input variables in this model are the parameters in the decision 
time  equation. Decision time is calculated with information certainty and human 
factor. As discussed in Chapter III, information certainty
( cst )
( )I  depends on the number of 
ships in task force and human factor depends on individual character. The third input 
variable is the missile arrival rate. The simulation output is the number of surviving ships 
after missile defense. The criterion is simple and fully reasonable.  
E. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The simulation experiment has three objectives. First, I want to determine the 
statistical significance of each of the three factors mentioned above (information 
certainty, human factor, and missile inter arrival rate) as well as any interaction among 
parameters. Second, I want to determine on approximate value for α , the coefficient that 
modifies probability of survival, as suggested by Schutzer. Third, I want to determine if 
there are statistically significant difference among the 3 modes of C2 (PCW, NCW, and 
CEC) as observed in the simulation.  
In order to get reasonable simulation output, I have to determine the appropriate 
value of parameters within the scenario.  
 
Scenario setting PCW Low(-1) Medium(0) High(1) 
Inter arrival time (Uniform) 0 ~ 15 0 ~ 10 0 ~ 5 
Information certainty ( )I  1 1 1 Parameters 
Human factor ( )h  0.1 0.6 0.9 
Number of ship 3 6 10 
 
Table 3. Scenario Setting of PCW. 
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The levels or values used for each of the parameters represent specific scenario 
settings, as seen in Table 3. The inter arrival times represent the capabilities of the enemy 
force, particularly the number and strength of enemy ships. The low inter arrival time 
represents enemy capability is weak, the medium represents intermediate capability, and 
the high implies that the strong capability. I assume maximum number of ships in a task 
force is 10, with the minimum number of ship set at 3, and the medium at 6. The 
information certainty  of PCW is always ‘1’, as discussed in Chapter III. Human 
factor (  setting ranges from 0.1 to 0.9. The low (optimistic) is 0.1, medium value is 0.6 
and high (pessimistic) value is 0.9. A low number for human factor results in enhanced 




Scenario setting NCW Low(-1) Medium(0) High(1) 
Inter arrival time (Uniform) 0 ~ 15 0 ~ 10 0 ~ 5 
Information certainty ( )I  9 36 100 Parameters 
Human factor ( )h  0.1 0.6 0.9 
Number of ship 3 6 10 
 
Table 4. Scenario Setting of NCW. 
 
Table 4 shows the scenario setting of NCW. The difference between PCW is the 
value of information certainty. Information certainty of NCW is relative to the number of 
ship and it increases by number of ship. 
Scenario setting CEC Low(-1) Medium(0) High(1) 
Inter arrival time (Uniform) 0 ~ 15 0 ~ 10 0 ~ 5 
Information certainty ( )I  16 49 121 Parameters 
Human factor ( )h  0.1 0.1 0.1 
Number of ship 3 6 10 
 
Table 5. Scenario Setting of CEC. 
 
Table 5 shows the scenario setting of CEC. The particular difference with PCW 
and NCW is that CEC setting has always high value of human factor term such as 
dummy variable for consistency of simulation design even if human factor does not affect 
CEC.  
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I will use a 3  factorial design, meaning there are three parameters under 
observation each at three levels. [Montgomery 1984] The three parameters are 
interarrival time, information certainty and human factor. Three levels correspond to low, 
medium and high setting. With three parameters at three levels each, there are a total of 
27 design points, or treatments. I use coded variables parameter setting according to the 




Design point Inter arrival time Information certainty Human factor 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 0 
3 1 1 -1 
4 1 0 1 
5 1 0 0 
6 1 0 -1 
7 1 -1 1 
8 1 -1 0 
9 1 -1 -1 
10 0 1 1 
11 0 1 0 
12 0 1 -1 
13 0 0 1 
14 0 0 0 
15 0 0 -1 
16 0 -1 1 
17 0 -1 0 
18 0 -1 -1 
19 -1 1 1 
20 -1 1 0 
21 -1 1 -1 
22 -1 0 1 
23 -1 0 0 
24 -1 0 -1 
25 -1 -1 1 
26 -1 -1 0 
27 -1 -1 -1 
 
Table 6. Experiment with Design Point. 
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1.764706 Graph of col. B above shows convergence to mean.
1.777778 Sample mean is 1.482
1.736842 Standard error is 0.034376
1.75 Sample std dev is 0.768673
1.809524 Sample minimum 1
1.772727 Sample maximum 5 low bin 1 bin width 1 high bin 4
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Figure 20.   Result of Simulation with Simsheet. 
 
The simulation used is a spreadsheet tool developed by Professor Alan Washburn 
of NPS as an Excel Addin. As seen in the figure above, the numbers on the left represents 
the number of remaining ships after air defense at each run. The small graph shows the 
expected number of remaining ship converging to a specific value. The box below it 
shows the sample mean, standard error, standard deviation, sample minimum and 
maximum. In above graph, the expected number of remaining ship is 1.5 and standard 
deviation is 0.78673. The right hand side histogram shows the frequency of different 
number of remaining ship. The frequency of 1 ship remaining is over 300 and 4 ships 
remaining approximately about 20 times. The small number of remaining ships represents 
the probability of survival of is small.  
F. SIMULATION OUTPUT SUMMARY 
In order to determine a reasonable estimate of the expected number of surviving 
ships for each C2 process, I simulated each design point 100 times. While not concerned 
with meeting a specific absolute error at a particular level of significance, as Law and 
Kelton described in their book, I focused on ensuring that the absolute error (represented  
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by standard error) of each mean was less than 0.1 of the mean. [Law and Kelton, 1991] 
This was easily achieved through a sample size of 100. I provide the mean value of these 
runs for each C2 process in the table below.  
 







factor PCW NCW CEC 
1 1 1 1 0 0.53 10 
2 1 1 0 0 0.75 10 
3 1 1 -1 0 0.55 10 
4 1 0 1 0 0 6 
5 1 0 0 0 0 6 
6 1 0 -1 0 0 6 
7 1 -1 1 0 0 0.24 
8 1 -1 0 0 0 0.66 
9 1 -1 -1 0 0 0.16 
10 0 1 1 0 1.27 10 
11 0 1 0 0 2.29 10 
12 0 1 -1 0 1.88 10 
13 0 0 1 0 0 6 
14 0 0 0 0 0.74 6 
15 0 0 -1 0 0.38 6 
16 0 -1 1 0 0 1.01 
17 0 -1 0 0 0 0.97 
18 0 -1 -1 0 0 1.07 
19 -1 1 1 0 7.39 10 
20 -1 1 0 0 7.65 10 
21 -1 1 -1 0 7.55 10 
22 -1 0 1 0 1.25 6 
23 -1 0 0 0 1.02 6 
24 -1 0 -1 0 0.81 6 
25 -1 -1 1 0 0 2.97 
26 -1 -1 0 0 0 3 
27 -1 -1 -1 0 0 3 
 
Table 7. Summary of Simulation Output. 
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A very significant result is that PCW has mean value of ‘0’ at all decision points. 
This implies that individual ship cannot survive in the scenario portrayed in this 
simulation environment, as decision time for PCW is too great to overcome. The task 
forces with CEC survive without the loss of ship when task force consists of 6 or 10 
ships, yet the task force has less success when it begins with 3 ships. Nevertheless, CEC 
is the most capable C2 system to defend air threat while NCW capability improves with a 
larger friendly task force. 
 




















Figure 21.   Number of Remaining Ship. 
 
G. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The results above show that PCW C2 process has no effectiveness within the 
experimental environment in this simulation. I therefore focus the remainder of my 
statistical analysis on NCW and CEC. I develop a metamodel based on the simulation 
output for NCW and CEC. A metamodel is an algebraic function relating the response to 
the important input factors serving as at least a rough proxy for full-blown, simulation 
and its purpose is to estimate or approximate the response surface. [Law and Kelton, 
1991]  
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In the development of this metamodel, the response variable is changed to 
survival ratio for statistical analysis instead of number of remaining ships. The survival 
rate is the ratio of the number of remaining ships after engagement to the initial number 
in the task force, and this response variable remove the impact of the initial number of 
ship.  
 
Decision point NCW CEC 
1 0.053 1 
2 0.075 1 
3 0.055 1 
4 0 1 
5 0 1 
6 0 1 
7 0 0.08 
8 0 0.22 
9 0 0.0533333 
10 0.127 1 
11 0.229 1 
12 0.188 1 
13 0 1 
14 0.1233333 1 
15 0.0633333 1 
16 0 0.3366667 
17 0 0.3233333 
18 0 0.3566667 
19 0.739 1 
20 0.765 1 
21 0.755 1 
22 0.2083333 1 
23 0.17 1 
24 0.135 1 
25 0 1 
26 0 1 
27 0 1 
 
Table 8. Survival Rate. 
 
1. Metamodel of NCW and CEC 
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My initial metamodel was a polynomial regression that included the three main 
effects, their squared terms, and all interactions. The purpose of including all of these 
terms is to find the model with the best fit, indicated by highest adjusted R2 [Devore, 
2003] The adjusted R2 is preferred over R2, as it takes into account the contribution of 
merely the presence of additional model factors. Additionally, I include polynomial terms 
in order to account for any nonlinearity in the response surface. The initial model output 
is below.  
 
NCW Coefficient Std. Error T statistics p-value 
Intercept 0.0373 0.0411 0.9071 0.3778 
Inter arrival time -0.1439 0.0190 -7.5584 0.0000 
Information certainty 0.1659 0.0190 8.7613 0.0000 
Human factor -0.0038 0.0330 -0.2014 0.8429 
Inter arrival time2 0.0830 0.0330 2.5179 0.0228 
Information certainty2 0.0881 0.0330 2.6729 0.0167 
Human factor2 -0.0223 0.0330 -0.6758 0.5088 
Inter arrival time : Information 
certainty -0.1730 0.0233 -7.4219 0.0000 
Inter arrival time : Human factor -0.0049 0.0233 -0.2121 0.8347 
Information certainty : Human 
factor -0.0066 0.0233 -0.2824 0.7812 
Inter arrival time : Information 
certainty : Human factor 0.0017 0.0285 0.0613 0.9519 
 
Table 9. Polynomial Regression Output of NCW Response. 
 
The adjusted R2 for this model is 0.872947, which explains a significant amount 
of variation of simulation output. But, the high p-values of the human factors term, all 
interaction terms with human factor, and the squared human factor term are very high, 
and therefore, human factor is not statistically significant. I remove these terms, and the 
result is below. 
 
NCW coefficient Std. Error T statistics p-value 
Intercept 0.0224 0.0309 0.7259 0.4795 
Inter arrival time -0.1439 0.0169 -8.4947 0.0000 
Information certainty 0.1639 0.0169 9.7961 0.0000 
Inter arrival time2 0.0830 0.0293 2.8298 0.0100 
Information certainty2 0.0881 0.0293 3.0040 0.0068 
Inter arrival time : Information 
certainty -0.1730 0.0207 -8.3413 0.0000 
 
Table 10. Polynomial Regression After Removing Non Significant Factor. 
45
The adjusted R2 for this model is 0.905657 that is an improvement over the initial 
model, and all remaining terms, based on p-value, are statistically significant. 
a. Analysis of NCW 
As described by Devore, the adequacy of a regression model depends on 
meeting the assumptions of normality and constant variance. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Residual vs. Fitted Value of NCW. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Quantiles of Standard Normal Plot of NCW. 
46
Figure 22 is a plot of residuals versus fitted value , while Figure 23 
is a normal probability plot. While the normality assumption is met, Figure 22 is 
somewhat troubling in that it shows a pattern in the residual plot. This curvature in the 
residual plot could mean that the constant variance assumption is violated, or that some 
key input factor has been omitted. Nevertheless, I consider this polynomial regression 






2 process. The final regression 
equation is  
( ) (2 20.0224 0.1439 0.1639 0.083 0.0881 0.173 4 1NCW I I Iλ λ λ= − + + + − × )−  
 
Figure 24.   Response Surface of NCW. 
 
Figure 24 shows the response surface based on the NCW metamodel. As 
coded values of +1 represent high inter arrival time and high information certainty, while 
-1 represent low inter arrival time and low information certainty, it can be readily 
discerned from the surface as to the marginal benefit in improving information certainty 
when faced with a specific arrival rate. Response surface looks flat because the slope of 
each combined coded value intervals are very slightly different.  
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b. Analysis of CEC 
I analyze CEC with polynomial regression in the same manner as earlier 
as NCW. However, human factor has no relationship with CEC, as I discussed in Chapter 
III. The result is seen below.   
 
CEC coefficient Std. Error t statistics p-value 
Intercept 0.9511 0.0493 19.2893 0.0000 
Inter arrival time -0.1470 0.0270 -5.444 0.0000 
Information certainty 0.2572 0.0270 9.5243 0.0000 
Inter arrival time2 0.0733 0.0468 1.5677 0.1319 
Information certainty2 -0.2572 0.0468 -5.4988 0.0000 
Inter arrival time : Information 
certainty 0.2206 0.0331 6.6680 0.0000 
 
Table 11. Polynomial Regression of CEC Response. 
 
The regression results for CEC indicate that all terms in this model for 
each factor, except inter arrival time2 are statistically significant. Adjusted R2 is 0.87507 
and p-value is very small. I check adequacy of this regression equation.  
 
 




Figure 26.   Quantiles of Standard Normal Plot of CEC. 
 
 
Figure 27.   Response Surface of CEC. 
 
The residual plot in Figure 25 shows that CEC regression equation 
roughly meets constant variance assumption. However, the normality assumption is 
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possibly violated in Figure 26. Figure 27 shows response surface of CEC, based on 
regression output. The model curvature is more pronounced. I consider this polynomial 
regression equation adequate to respect survival rate in CEC process. The final 
polynomial regression equation is:  
Ratio of ships remaining 
= ( ) ( )242206.02572.00733.02572.0147.09511. 22 −×+−++− III λλλ0  
2. Estimation of α  
The final analytical concern of this study is to estimateα , the probability of 
survival enhanced by improved C2 time impact. I estimate α  based on simulation output, 
realizing that the true α  is scenario dependent. Therefore, a change of the situation (with 
input variable changes) affects the simulation output and α . Nevertheless, I use the 
regression equations, or metamodel, as it can provide overall insight into the true value 
ofα . 
I estimate α by forming a ratio of CEC to NCW. The inter arrival time and 
information certainty are input as coded value and I use marginal value of response 
surface as survival rate. I calculate α by dividing survival rate of CEC with survival rate 
of NCW. 
( ) ( )2 2/ 2 20.9511 0.147 0.2572 0.0733 0.2572 0.2206 4 40.0224 0.1439 0.1639 0.083 0.0881 0.173( )CEC NCW
I I I
I I I
λ λ λα λ λ λ
− + + − + ×= −− + + + − ×  
It is apparent that α will vary over the range of values for information certainty 
and inter arrival rate. Therefore, I create a response surface for α by dividing each 
variable into 10 sub intervals. This results in 100 surface survival rate points of both 
NCW and CEC. I calculate the mean and variance of α  over this region. 
 
Alpha 
Minimum value 1.199 
Maximum value 1.466 
Mean value 1.299 
Variance 0.00476 
Standard deviation 0.0689 
 







Alpha of CEC to NCW
Inter arrival time 
Information certainty
Figure 28.   α of CEC. 
 
Table 12 a statistical summary ofα , while Figure 28 shows the surface ofα with 
100 data, the expected value is 1.299 and its variance is 0.00476. As the variance is small 
in relation to the mean, I can confidently conclude that CEC system can improve 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
It is apparent that enhanced C2 system can have improved engagement outcomes. 
NCW and CEC can elevate engagement capability by improving information superiority. 
I estimated its improvement by enhancing the MOE of C2 systems of NCW and CEC. 
NCW and CEC can apply to any phase of warfare. However, I focus on anti missile 
defense because CEC is mainly developed for littoral anti air defense.  
I use Schutzer’s C2 theory as a foundation for this research. He developed a model 
for naval engagement and his significant contribution is that he predicted the significance 
of time regarding enhanced C2 system. My analysis focuses on this time impact to the 
commander’s decision time. I modified Schutzer’s theory and estimate MOE and 
coefficient α  of the probability of survival with mathematical and simulation method. 
In estimating the C2 MOE mathematically, I defined three parameters (decision 
time, information certainty, and human factor) and estimate their values and I calculate 
three factors (probability of survival, allocation ratio, and exchange rate). Information 
certainty and human factor are my contributions to C2 analysis. Information certainty of 
NCW and CEC is affected directly by the number of ships, but under PCW, information 
certainty stays constant. This implies the contribution of the network complexity to C2 
system. The human factor implies commander’s personal character. I assume that NCW 
is affected by both of these parameters, but that CEC is not affected by human factor.  
I calculate the decision time for each C2 operating process and implement into 
MOE equation. The result shows that CEC can improve the friendly force chance for 
success relative to NCW and PCW. Superior information certainty greatly affects the 
MOE.  
I estimate the enhanced coefficient α  of the probability of survival based on a 
simulation model. I simulate an air defense scenario and use the input I derived 
explaining decision time, information certainty, and human factor as simulation 
parameters. In addition, I introduce missile inter arrival time into simulation. My 
simulation output indicates that PCW cannot be compared with NCW or CEC, in that 
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PCW has no survivability within simulation environment. In order to estimate α and 
compare NCW and CEC, I develop a metamodel through polynomial regression based on 
simulation outputs. This metamodel show NCW and CEC are not affected by human 
factor but are affected by missile inter arrival time and information certainty. Both 
metamodels provide prediction capability by mapping a response surface.  
Based on the regression equations, I obtain 100 response surface points for each 
NCW and CEC, and calculate α with these data points. With a simple statistical 
calculation, I estimate mean value and variance ofα of CEC to NCW. The mean value is 
1.299 and variance is 0.00476, as the variance very small in relation to mean, I conclude 
with confidence that CEC can improve MOE by 1.299 relative to NCW.  
As a result, I find the NCW or CEC can improve capability of C2 system, with 
CEC providing the greatest improvement. Statistical analysis shows that NCW and CEC 
are not affected by human factor. Enhancement of C2 system results from the information 
certainty that is caused by network reinforcement. Finally, this research supports the CEC 
methodology and its contribution to engagement capability. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are three areas concerning this research that deserve further study. The first 
concerns the other parameters in Schutzer’s specific C2 theory that I did not consider. 
These are initial information accuracy ( )2σ  and density of enemy distribution. These two 
factors could possibly have a significant effect on C2. 
Second, there are other important features of CEC that may influence the result of 
both mathematical and simulation output. Two of these are precision cueing and 
composite tracking. Accurately representing these two variables may allow for 
representing the contribution of CEC to operational success. 
Finally, it could be interesting to develop a more fidelity in more detailed 
simulation. As I mentioned above, combat engagement results in interaction, and the air 
defense situation will be changed as friendly force counterattack. The enemy force firing 
missile policy will also change. Other aspects that can influence the result are missile 
inter arrival time distribution, detection probability, type of ship, kinds of anti air missile, 
and so forth. In other words, there are parameters that were considered and some that 
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vary throughout the engagement. Introducing these parameters, and updating them 
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